I am currently working on three main projects: 

Fundamentality: what are the constraints on metaphysical explanation? How do these constraints impact various views about what is fundamental, such as physicalism, generalism, wavefunction realism, and logical atomism?

Probability: I am working on revitalizing the classical approach to probability, by developing and defending the view that physical probabilities are determined by a uniform measure over the space of physically possible worlds.

Physicalism: how, exactly, does the success of physics make physicalism a plausible view? And what is the best version of physicalism – is it formulated in terms of grounding, identification, or some combination of the two?

Papers

Published

  • Grounded Shadows, Groundless Ghosts (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2022). Defends wave-function realism ­– the view that the quantum-mechanical wave-function is a fundamental field in a high-dimensional space – against the objection that it cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the manifest image. Final version

  • Grounding Identity in Existence (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2023). Defends the view that the facts about which things are identical and distinct are grounded in the facts about what exists. Final version

  • Proportionality in Causation: Parts I & II (Philosophy Compass, 2023). Surveys various formulations of the idea that causes are ‘proportional’ to their effects, their applications and their challenges. Part I Part II

  • Cohesive Proportionality (Philosophical Studies, 2023). Argues that the idea that causes should be proportional to their effects should be rescued from the disjunction problem by appeal to the notion of cohesion. Final version

  • Two Approaches to Metaphysical Explanation (Nous, 2024). Distinguishes two forms of metaphysical explanation – one based on generation and the other on reduction. Argues that there are important differences between them and that we need both. Final version

  • Generalism Without Generation (Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming). Distinguishes two versions of generalism, and argues that only one of them is able to provide satisfactory explanations for truths about individuals. Final version

Under review

  • Shows that existing compatibilist approaches to overdetermination face counterexamples, and argues that compatibilists should focus on the relations between causal connections. Draft

  • Argues that the only version of grounding physicalism which can adequately explain conscious experiences is panpsychist. Draft

In progress

  • Probability from Symmetry. Develops and defends a version of the classical approach to probability, on which probabilities are determined by a uniform measure over the space of physical possibilities.

  • Scrutability and Metaphysical Explanation. Argues that neither identities nor grounding relations are a priori entailed by the fundamental truths.

  • The Nomic Exclusion Argument for Physicalism. Argues that the exclusion argument should be formulated in terms of laws rather than causation.

  • Conjunction as Identity. Argues that a conjunctive proposition just is/are its conjuncts (rather than being grounded in its conjuncts).